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Many theories of personal identity allow for the metaphysical possibility of 
fission. In 1981 Nozick proposed a theory of personal identity called 'the 
closest continuer view' (CCV) that denies fission of persons but allows fission 
of human beings. CCV may thus appear to reduce 'person' to a 
nonmetaphysical, practical notion. Against this, I argue that CCV is an 
externalist metaphysical theory that purports to solve a problem that is 
insurmountable within the confines of an internalist metaphysics of personal 
identity. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
From the late 50's and early 60's onwards one of the main concerns in the 
debate over the metaphysics of personal identity was the fact that many 
theories of personal identity seemed to allow for the science fiction scenario 
of one person 'splitting up' into two (Williams 1956-7, Shoemaker 1963). 
This possibility, known as fission, is likely to clash with the metaphysical 
intuitions of most people, but it certainly clashes with our everyday legal and 
moral practice. Consider the following cases: When one person becomes 
two, who will own the original person's property, who will be married to the 
original person's spouse, who should we hold responsible for crimes 
committed by the original person, etc. etc. Rhetorical questions such as 
these make it absolutely clear that our practice is based on the assumption 
that one person can only continue as one person, not two or more. Hence 
the problem of fission.  
The responses  to this problem can be ordered into three groups: we 
can either (1) fission is accepted and out moral and legal practices are 
adjusted accordingly, (2) fission is rejected because it is incompatible with 
legal and moral practices, or (3) fission is rejected because it contradicts 
metaphysical intuitions.  
Option (1) is Parfit's famous 'bite the bullett' position (Parfit, 1971, 
1976, 1984). When the metaphysics of personal identity clashes with our 
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practices, this means we should revise our practices since they are based, 
apparently, on false beliefs.  
On option (2) the concept of 'personal identity' derives its meaning 
primarily from our real (moral and legal) practices. This means that 
whenever a metaphysical rendering of personal identity appears to allow for 
possibilities that do not fit our practice, we should conclude that personal 
identity is not a concept fit to be analysed in this metaphysical way. One 
route to this position is resisting the thought-experiments that ground the 
metaphysical possibility of fission (see Wilkes 1988; Gale 1991; Parfit 
attributes this option to Wittgenstein (Parfit 1984, p. 273)). Other routes 
involve scrutiny of our practices (Black 2001; Hope 1994; Haksar 1991) and 
a (Kantian) emphasis on unity of agency (Korsgaard 1989). 
According to option (3), the possibility of fission clashes not just 
with our practice, but also with our metaphysical intuitions. Thus we have 
reason to reconsider any theory of personal identity that allows for fission, 
in order to see what is metaphysically wrong with it. Many theories of 
personal identity have been proposed that either avoid fission completely or 
else that amend theories that do allow for fission with extra premisses so as 
to ban fission in the end. These theories vary form Cartesian dualist 
theories (e.g. Madell 1981; Swinburne 1984) to animalist theories (Wiggins 
1980) that reject fission on a posteriori grounds to psychological continuity 
theories that reject fission a priori (Lewis 1976; Mills 1993). 
In 1981 Robert Nozick proposed a theory of personal identity called 
'the closest continuer view' (CCV after this). CCV rules out the possibility 
of one person splitting up into two while it allows for the possibility of one 
human being fissioning. It first accepts all metaphysical considerations that 
lead to the possibility of fission. But then it offers a rationale for choosing 
which one of the two (or more) resulting persons after fission is identical 
with the original person, excluding the other(s). This gives the impression 
that Nozick considers fission unacceptable on a priori grounds, but that the 
reasons for this are not of a metaphysical nature.  
So, CCV seems to belong in category (2).  In this paper, however, I 
shall argue that this is not correct and that CCV belongs in catergory (3). 
Nozick's theory is not a practice-inspired amendation of theories of personal 
identity that allow for fission when only metaphysical considerations are 
taken into account. Rather it is an externalist metaphysical theory that 
purports to solve a problem that is insurmountable within the confines of 
an internalist metaphysics of personal identity. Or so I shall argue. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the next section, I shall 
outline the considerations leading up to the possibility of fission. In Section 
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3 I shall discuss the closest continuer view. Finally, in Section 4, I will 
discuss the main objection to CCV levelled by metaphysically minded 
philosophers, based on the so-called 'only X and Y principle'. These 
objections can be met by CCV. Showing how CCV does this makes clear 
why its opposition to fission is grounded not in practical considerations, but 
rather in an externalist metaphysics of personal identity.   
 
1. CCV's Background: The Possibility of Fission 
The closest continuer view, Nozick’s theory of personal identity, is best 
understood against the background of a number of developments in the 
debate on personal identity in the 17th century, and in the 1960’s and -70’s. 
Three such developments have to be mentioned explicitly: (1) Problems 
surrounding personal identity following Locke’s statement of a 'memory 
criterion', (2) the materialistic philosophy of mind by means of which 
philosophers such as Williams and Shoemaker attempted to handle these 
problems, and (3) the fact that as a result of this approach personal identity 
was no longer viewed as strict Leibnizian identity, but rather as ‘personal 
continuation’: a transitive relation of temporal succession between persons-
at-a-point-in-time, or ‘person-stages’. Let me say something about these three 
points before introducing CCV. 
 (1) In 1690 Locke came up with a psychology-based account of personal 
identity over time. Around the time Nozick developed his CCV, this 
account was generally interpreted as a memory-criterion (see, however, 
Schechtman 1990, 1994): What makes two ‘person-stages’ at different times 
stages of the same person, according to the Locke of the 1960's and '70's, is 
that the later stage is able to remember experiences had by the previous 
stage. Whether or not this position was meant as a full-fledged theory of 
diachronic personal identity is a matter under discussion. But we need not 
concern ourselves with that here. What is important is that the debate over 
personal identity in the past century sparked off when Locke’s theory, 
interpreted as a memory-criterion with all the problems that came with it 
was given a fresh chance, mainly because contemporary materialism gave us 
a handle on some of the most vexing of these problems (see 2).  
 One of the implausible aspects of the ‘theory’ was that memory alone 
seems a bit meagre: when the connection between an experience and an 
experience-memory counts as co-constituting personal identity over time, 
why not count in the connections between intentions and the actions 
motivated by them? Or why not include the kind of connections that secure 
the fact that many times we stick to our beliefs and desires over large periods 
of time. Or, when we do change our minds, the kinds of connections that 
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connect various stages in a process of deliberated change? In short: various 
kinds of psychological connections over time were added to the memory 
criterion (mainly in the 1960’s and ‘70’s). At the same time, the idea that 
personal identity over time is constituted by psychological connections was 
adopted from Locke, though not universally. 
 Already in Locke’s time the psychological criterion of personal identity was 
heavily criticised. Some of the problems uncovered, such as the criticism 
that memory itself presupposes personal identity,1  were ‘solved’2  by 
invoking what was not available to Locke: a materialistic causal theory of 
memory.This allows for what we now refer to as ‘body swaps’: the possibility 
that persons change body without becoming someone else as in the Prince 
and Pauper fantasy. Many of the problems with the neo-Lockean views 
discussed in this paper follow from this possibility.  
 (2) What is crucial in Locke’s body-swaps is that they need not be 
considered cases in which autonomous and substantial souls exchange 
bodies. Were that to be the case, the person is still tied to one ‘vessel’: the 
soul. But in Locke’s example, and in those of the twentieth-century neo-
Lockeans3  a person can change bodies when all the attitudes and 
psychological characteristics of a person are reinstantiated in another 
(numerically distinct) body or—as in Locke’s example—body-soul complex.  
 Materialism was not insignificant in staging these thought experiments, 
which was why twentieth-century neo-Lockeans could fantasize way beyond 
simple Prince-and-Pauper cases. For, once the mind is a material brain in 
specific states, it can be manipulated, split-up, it’s states can be copied and 
instilled in another brain, it can be transplanted, etc.4  With these 
possibilities puzzle cases arise, one type of which I shall discuss shortly.  
 But first it is worth mentioning that the thought-experiment industry that 
was started by a psychological criterion of personal identity over time began 
to infect as well theories of personal identity that were in part or wholly 
based on spatio-temporal continuity of the body. Locke started the 
‘experiments’, but materialism about the mind really let them flourish, and 
since the body is a material item as well, it fell prey to all kinds of imaginary 
experimenting in the literature. The reason I mention this is first of all that 
                                                           
1 Butler 1736, Reid 1785.  
2 I put ‘solved in between scare quotes because I do not believe there is a real solution to 
this so-called circularity problem. See Slors 2001a for a nonmaterialist alternative. 
3 E.g. Shoemaker, Lewis, Perry, Parfit. But we may also count in philosophers such as 
Noonan and Nozick if we don’t think of ascribing import to the body as anti-Lockean. 
4 For more on the connection between materialism or physicalism and thought-
experiments in the personal identity debate, see Slors 2001b, pp. 28-35. 
 5 
Nozick’s views on personal identity neither turn the person into a 
completely psychological being, nor into a pure corporeal thing—for Nozick 
both mind and body matter, even though mind matters more. Secondly, the 
root thought-experiment that is at the basis of many puzzles concerning 
personal identity applies to the body as well as to the mind: it is the 
possibility of fission. 
 (3) Before discussing fission, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that 
once a person is viewed as a material being—whether they be purey 
psychological beings, bodies, or composite body-minds (à la Merleau Ponty’s 
“corps sujet”)—a person is not a simple indivisible entity but a composite 
one, made up of a huge number of ‘parts’. This has consequences for the 
kind ‘person’ and for the explanandum ‘personal identity’. When a person is 
a simple indivisible entity, a Cartesian ‘ego’, say, identity over time is not 
hindered by the possibility of change over time. A Cartesian ego at a certain 
time is only the same ego as one existing a while ago when it has all its 
characteristics in common with that earlier one, i.e. when these two ego's are 
strictly identical in the Leibnizian sense. However, when a person is viewed 
as a composite being, as materialist positions do, strict identity over time is 
simply not to be had.  
 But if this is the case, can we still speak of personal identity? Strictly 
speaking not. However, the so-called 'complex view' on persons—"persons are 
composite, divisible entities”—allows for an alternative to strict identity that 
is close enough to real identity to stick to the deeply entrenched term 
‘personal identity’. In the course of a normal human life, we assume that the 
various ‘person stages’ that make up this one life, this one person, are 
connected in such a way as to secure the continued existence of one person. 
Oppinions differ as to the exact nature of these connections, but that need 
not concern us here.  
The most important point for now is that this loose use of the term 
'personal identity' opens up the possibility of one person stage bearing the 
kind of connection that normally secures personal identity (in the non-strict 
sense of personal continuation) to two or more simultaneously existing later 
person stages. Here the transitivity of identity is seriously compromised; two 
later stages can only be identical to the previous stage if they are identical 
with each other, which they are not. This is where the fission thought 
experiments come into the discussion. Let me elaborate on them before 
introducing CCV. 
 The fission thought experiments claim to be examples of the above 
possibility of one person stage at an earlier time connected to two (or more) 
later person stages in the way person stages are connected in the course of 
 6 
the life of a normal person. Of course, whether or not this is possible 
depends on one’s views on what the relation is that normally connects 
various person stages so as to constitute the life of one person. At the time, 
the above mentioned psychological connections were thought to be of 
paramount importance. Bodily continuity was considered important as well 
by some. As to these psychological connections, it is important to note that 
it is not just the case the e.g. one person stage had an experience and 
another person stage a (qualitatively similar) memory of that experience. It is 
just as important that the memory and the experience are causally 
connected in the (epistemically) right way, so that the memory truly is a 
memory of the experience (instead of, say, a remarkable coincidence). With 
this background, we can move on to the experiments. 
 The idea is that one person splits up into two (or more) persons at some 
point in time. This can be ‘done’ (i.e. imagined) in various ways (note the 
role of materialism): One influential thought-experiment uses an imaginary 
machine that can record all the information about our bodies-and-minds at 
one point in time and then use this information to re-create a qualitatively 
identical body-and-mind at some other place (the information could be 
transported via radio, say). This is known as the teletransportation case 
(Parfit 1984, p199 ff.). Another experiment presupposes persons whose left 
and right brain hemispheres are more or less identical (an unusual, but real 
possibility). If the bundle of nerves that connects the hemispheres (the 
corpus callosum) is severed (as in real commisurotonomy cases), we can 
imagine that one brain half is taken out of the original skull, placed into the 
head of another (say, qualitativelt similar) body and connected in the right 
way to the lower brain and nerves of that second body. The result would be 
two qualitatively identical (or more or less identical, depending on ones 
views as to the bodily nature of personal identity) persons (Parfit 1984, pp. 
245-8). As a last example, we can imagine two qualitatively identical bodies 
where the information stored in the brain of one person is completely and 
without loss being transferred to the other brain, whose contents have been 
erased, without distorting the original person’s brain and mind (based on 
Williams 1970). Again, the result would be two persons that are at least 
psychologically continuous, as it is called, with the original person. On a 
psychological criterion of personal identity, this means that one person 
splits up into two. 
 Now the question is: how are the two persons that are the outcome of 
these experiments related to the one person that began them? In all cases, 
the claim is that the kind of relation that holds between a person and her 
two successors is such that should it have held between an initial person 
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stage and only one successor, we would have no trouble at all viewing this 
situation as one in which a single person continues to exist over time. Here’s 
the problem: In the case of one successor, we speak of one person persisting 
through time, of personal identity. But when there are two successors, 
personal identity is out of the question; identity is a transitive relation and 
the resulting two persons are not identical, so that they cannot both be 
identical with the initial pre-fission stage. Yet they both bear a relation to the 
initial stage that, should the initial person not have split up, would have 
constituted personal identity. But how can that be? Should we not rather 
conclude that the kind of relation between the person stages in both cases 
are not identity-constituting after all in normal ‘one successor cases’? 
 Parfit was the only philosopher to anwer "yes" here. He is a revisionist: 
when our intuitions lead to paradoxes, that is just too bad for our 
intuitions. What Parfit did was simply deny that personal identity is what 
matters to us in practical reasoning. This is what the fission experiments 
teach us. In these experiments identity fails to hold. But the kind of 
psychological connection that according to Parfit sustains personal identity 
under normal conditions is still intact. And that kind of connection is what 
matters to us, not identity. Identity is just the holding of this relation in the 
absense of fission, and since fission is absent in all actual cases, we 
mistakenly think that identity matters to us. 
 
3. The Closest Continuer View 
Parfit's revisionistic approach leaves a lot of questions unanswered, mainly 
questions about practical reasoning in fission cases: who of two fission-
products (I use this respectless term for lack of a better one) will own the 
house of the original person? Who gets the pay check right after fission? 
Who is married to the original person’s spouse? Etc. etc. These questions 
are very hard to answer, if they can be answered at all. Yet praxis would 
require an immediate answer. This is an extremely pressing reason to resist 
the possibility of fission.  
Nozick's closest continuer view opts for a non-revisionary way of 
handling fission cases. It does resist the possibility of one person as a 
legal/moral entity splitting up into two beings with the same legal/moral 
status. But at the same time Nozick accepts the complex view,  which seems 
to allow for fission metaphysically speaking. This may seem to place CCV in 
category (2) mentioned in the introduction. In order to argue why this is, in 
the end, not the case, more needs to be said about CCV. 
 The observation with which CCV starts is that in very many of the fission 
cases, it is simply not true that we consider the two fission products equally 
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tightly connected in a psychological and/or bodily sense to the original 
person. Consider the teletransportation case Parfit (1984, pp. 199-201) 
discusses. In it, a duplicate of a person is produced on Mars while the 
original person continues to live (for a couple of days only, but I’ll get to 
that later on). In such a case we have a person who is psychologically 
continuous with the original person on Mars, and a person who is both 
psychologically and bodily continuous with the original person. This 
difference, Nozick insists, will strike most of us as intuitively relevant: the 
latter fission-product is much more closesly connected to the original person 
than the person on Mars. We can only treat both later person stages as 
relevantly similarly connected to the original person when we forget our 
intuitions and go by a pre-established theory of personal identity or personal 
continuation that considers bodily continuity irrelevant. But this ignores the 
fact that many people will consider bodily continuity at least relevant 
enough to consider the fission product on Earth a closer continuer to the 
original person than the person on Mars.  
 When differences in closeness of continuation are recognized, and with it 
the practical need to determine which person is the continuer of the 
original person, it becomes rational in a practical sense to consider the 
closest continuer identical with the original person, while the less closer 
continuer is a newly-made person (that is qualitatively much like it’s 
competitor). This is the core of CCV. But a number of qualifications are in 
order. 
 First of all, Nozick does not commit himself to rigid parameters that 
determine closeness of continuation. Instead he grants that intuitions may 
differ as to what closeness of continuation amounts to. CCV is a model that 
allows us to structure and handle the intuitions about personal identity we 
have acquired in normal circumstances when they are applied to abnormal 
science-fiction puzzle cases. Thus Nozick acknowledges that some people 
may think bodily continuity totally irrelevant to personal identity and hence 
consider both fission products in a teletransportation case equally close 
continuers (as e.g. Parfit does). 
 This brings us to the second qualification: what if a person splits up into 
two equally close continuers? Nozick concludes that in such a case neither 
can be identical with the original person (on pain of violating the transitivity 
of identity). He is thus willing to concede that there are cases in which 
person stages are connected in such a way that they might have been identical 
whereas they are in fact not identical. For, should the person on Earth die at 
the moment the Mars person comes into existence, the Mars person would 
have been identical with the original pre-teletransportation person.  
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Here we see the first glimp of what makes CCV special and 
controversial: apparently, according to Nozick, the relation that holds 
between person stages only in a normal person’s life can under certain 
exceptional circumstances be insufficient for personal identity. Apparently, 
then, the circumstances in which these relations hold matter to personal 
identity while they are not part of the intrinsic relations between person 
stages themselves. We shall soon see that this is crucial for CCV. 
 But first I have to mention another kind of example in which neither of 
the continuers in a fission case can be considered identical with the original 
person. It is not always true, according to Nozick, that the closest continuer 
is identical with the original person. For various reasons the closest 
continuer may not be connected in a close enough manner.  As an example 
of such a case we may imagine a teletransportation case in which two 
replica’s are sent to different planets while the original person (body + 
mind) is destroyed and where the radio transmission of the data was flawed 
so that both continuers are very unlike the original person. We do not have 
to worry too much here about when person stages are closely enough 
connected to be identical (in the absence of a closer continuer). Again, CCV 
is a model of handling intuitions, and in cases such as these we can fill in 
details by inserting our own. 
 The closest continuer view comes in two versions, a local and a global one. 
Take Parfit’s teletransportation case again, with one slight change: the time 
in which both the Earth person and the Mars person live simultaneously is 
substantially longer, say one month. During that time, the Mars person 
changes significantly due to his new environment, to all sorts of biographical 
events etc. At the time of the death of the Earth person, the Mars person, 
who will continue to live for another sixty years, has changed so dramatically 
that it is no longer qualitatively similar enough to the original person at the 
time of fission to count as his continuer. On the local version of CCV, this 
means that when the Earth person dies, the original person dies since there 
is no continuer left that is close enough.  
 On the global version, however, there is a bias in favour of longevity. We 
should keep in mind that should the Earth person have died at the time of 
fission or shortly after it, the Mars person would have become the continuer 
of the original person. In that case, then, it is the original person who goes 
through all the changes on Mars so that he is still the original person after 
all these changes. The Mars person is still ‘psychologically continuous’, as it 
is called, with the original person (and ‘causally continuous’ at least with 
regard to her body). The global version of CCV holds that the longevity of 
the Mars person outweighs the bodily continuation with the original person 
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of the Earth person when it comes to determining closeness of 
continuation. So on this version of CCV, in this scenario, the Mars person 
will be identical with the original person because, as Nozick puts it (1981: 
43) “it seems so unfair for a person to be doomed by an echo of his former 
self.” 
 CCV may appear to respect all our intuitions regarding personal identity. 
But that impression is slightly misleading. CCV has consequences that 
appear counter-intuitive. Take teletransportation again. A person is 
teletransported to Mars, but, as in Parfit’s original example, the original 
person is not destroyed on Earth, he remains alive. However, due to the 
procedure, he has now acquired a heart condition that only gives him a few 
days to live. In such a case, according to CCV, the Earth person after the 
fission procedure is the original person, not the Mars person, because he 
and not the Mars person is the closest continuer. But what happens after 
the Earth person dies? When we suppose that the timespan in which both 
persons live is relatively short and that nothing dramatic happens to the 
Mars person, then the Mars person becomes the closest continuer. And 
that, according to CCV, means that the Mars person becomes identical with 
the original person, whereas he was not identical with that person before. 
But how can the Mars person suddenly become identical with the original 
person when neither the original person, nor the Mars person changes in 
any respect (what changes is the passing away of the Earth person)? 
 The question is merely rhetorical. The counterintuitive idea that whether 
or not y at time t2 is a stage of the same person as x at t1 is dependent on 
factors other than merely facts internal to x and y is explicitly endorsed by 
Nozick. In fact it is the hallmark of CCV. The principle rejected here was 
later dubbed ‘the only x and y principle’ (Noonan 1989; see the next 
section). And this rejection is the most central contribution of CCV to the 
personal identity debate.  
 Is CCV an attempt to limit the influence of metaphysics on our theorizing 
about personal identity by letting the practical demand for the all-or-
nothingness of personal identity (i.e. the impossibility of fission) trump 
metaphysical conclusions? Or are CCV's demand to identify only one 
'fission-product' as the real continuer of the original person, and its allowing 
for the 'transfer of identity' in cases where the closest continuer dies, 
metaphysically motivated? Nozick does not discuss this question, so that it is 
hard to answer it through textual exegesis. This doesn't mean that the 
question is unanswerable. For, as I shall argue in the next section, the core 
thesis of CCV—the rejection of the 'only x and y principle'—is only not 
susceptible to the criticism from friends of the principle when CCV is 
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interpreted as an externalist metaphysical position. The strongest 
interpretation of CCV, then, is one in which it is a metaphysical solution to 
a metaphysical problem, not an appeal for practical constraints on 
metaphysics.  
 
4. The ‘Only x and y Principle’ 
At the heart of CCV is the rejection of the only x and y principle, the 
principle according to which the question whether y at t2 is identical with x 
at t1 depends on (intrinsic) facts about x, y and their (intrinsic) relations 
over time only. CCV is about managing intuitions. Nozick does not claim to 
be able to save every intuition in every puzzle case, he ‘only’ claims that 
CCV can save more intuitions than any of its competitor theories. So, when 
most intuitions can be saved by giving up on one other intuition, this 
should be done, according to Nozick. And the intuition he gives up is the 
only x and y princile.  
 Unsurprisingly, the most serious attack on CCV consists of the claim that 
the only x and y principle cannot be given up on pain of accepting absurd 
consequences. If that is indeed the case, the principle is not just an 
intuition, but really and argument against CCV. Let me discuss two views on 
the principle that treat it as such. Later on I shall argue that CCV can be 
defended against these views, thereby showing clearly it’s externalist, 
metaphysical nature. 
 One view on which the principle is defended as one with argumentative 
force is David Wiggins's. It was published one year before CCV’s conclusive 
statement in 1981, but directed at a proto version of CCV Wiggins calls ‘the 
best candidate approach’. The argument Wiggins sees in the principle can 
best be illustrated by a parallel to a fission case, derived from the story of the 
ship of Theseus.  
 In the story of the ship of Theseus, one plank is removed and a new one 
inserted in it’s place. Over the course of time this happens with every plank 
of the whole ship untill in the end the whole ship is made of new planks, 
i.e. untill no plank in the ship is identical with a plank in the original ship. 
Yet we are not inclined to think this is a completely different ship from 
Theseus’s. In fact it still is Theseus’s ship because the change happened 
gradually (compare: in about seven years all the cells in your body will be 
renewed, but this does not mean you have acquired a different body).  
 But now the story is altered slightly so as to produce a competitor for 
continuation. The old planks of the ship are cast away. But they are 
collected and in the end reassembled so as to form, once again, the ‘original 
ship’. That is, it would have been the original ship in an unproblematic way 
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if it weren’t for the fact that the ship of Theseus is still sailing around as the 
ship of Theseus (now with new planks). So, we have a situation in which 
two ships compete for being the closest continuer to Theseus’s original ship: 
one ship which has undergone a slow process of rejuvination and another 
that consists of all original materials. The first one of these is fairly obviously 
the closest continuer since it is spatio-temporally continuous with the 
original ship, whereas the second ship is only a continuation of the original 
ship with a spatio-temporal intermittance. Nevertheless, should the first ship 
be burned when the latter one is reassembled, the latter one would have 
been the ship of Theseus.  
 So, there are three relevant possible worlds: (1) The old planks are merely 
cast away and not reassembled while the original ship is rejuvinated plank 
by plank. Let us call the original ship t. Let us call the rejuvinated continuer 
j. It is close enough to t and has no competitor. Therefore, j = t. (2) The 
rejuvination proceeds as in (1) but the old planks are reassembled so as to 
construct another competitor for continuation of t. Let us call the 
rejuvinated boat in this possible world j’ and the new assembly of old planks 
o. Since j’  is a closer continuer of t than o, j’ = t. (3) The ship of theseus is 
dismantled plank by plank, after which it ceases to exist. But the planks are 
reassembled so as to form the ship of Theseus once again. We may call the 
newly assembled ship of old planks o’. Since o’ has no competitor for being 
the continuation of t, and since it is close enough to t (it has the same form 
and consists of the numerically same materials), we may say that o’ = t.  
 Now compare worlds (2) and (3). In specific, compare o to o’. Is there a 
difference? Both ships are made of reassembled old planks of t. Intrinsically 
there is no difference whatsoever. Yet, and this is Wiggins’s point, o and o’ 
have to be completely different ships if CCV holds. For, on CCV o = t and 
o’ ≠ t, therefore o ≠ o’. And that is absurd: where is the difference between 
the ships? 
 (Note that CCV is implicitly placed in category (2) of the introduction: 
There is a difference in the ways o and o' will be treated, given the difference 
in the presence/absence of t. Wiggins will certainly not deny that. And so 
apparently Wiggins's point is: a difference in the ways in which o and o' are 
treated cannot amount to a real, metaphysical difference between them. 
Wiggins's argument, then, consists of placing CCV in category (2), and 
appealing to the intuition that all category (2) theories must be false, since it 
is absurd to think that nonmetaphysical properties such as how o is treated 
contribute to what o is.) 
 The fact that this argument—in my minimalized rendering of it—end with a 
rhetorical question—where is the difference between o and o'?—is an 
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indication that the argumentative force hinges on intuition. Wiggins does 
not deny this (1980, p. 95). And that is the weakness of this 
counterargument. Nozick seems to agree that rejecting the only x and y 
principle is counterintuitive, but insists we should reject it anyway because 
doing so saves an immense number of other intuitions. What Wiggins does 
not show is that CCV is inconsistent or incoherent. CCV is consistent and 
coherent in handling this example: whether or not the reassembled ship is 
identical with t depends on whether it has a competitor continuer that is 
closer to t. And so, there is a significant difference between o and o’. 
 Noonan sees this problem and tries to remedy it by attempting to dig up 
more argument in the principle, not just intuition. For this purpose he uses 
Geach’s notion of ‘mere Cambridge change’. Mere Cambridge change 
happens to an object or property when a proposition about it changes in 
tuth value without anything intrinsic happening to the object or property 
itself. Thus, suppose you are the second fastest runner on Earth. Without 
your being aware of it, the fastest runner on Earth dies. So suddenly you 
become the fastest runner on Earth. But essentially nothing about you, this 
person, changes. This is mere Cambridge change.  
 The difference between worlds (2) and (3) according to Noonan is such 
that with respect to o and o’, we can say that a change from world (2) to (3) 
amounts to a mere Cambridge change with respect to o. Thus, o’ cannot 
really differ from o, it can only differ in a mere Cambridge way. Thus, to say 
that o ≠ o’ is absurd. 
 Whether or not there is a real argument here is a matter that is not settled 
immediately. But we might forgo that question by asking whether the 
change in identity in, say, the teletransportation case is a mere Cambridge 
change in the insignificant sense Geach used the term. For a change of 
identity, even if it is just a change in how one is regarded by others and by 
oneself, is not insignificant at all when we take into account the fact that a 
person is a social entity and that personhood has social dimensions. With 
the passing away of the Earth person, the Mars person suddenly owns a 
condo, say, is married to a woman he fancied but someone else was married 
to, etc. etc. Things change for him, and they change dramatically. Is this 
mere Cambridge change? Not in the sense that it is mere Cambridge change. 
This is significant change. But it is like Cambridge change in that the change 
is brought about by something external to the object that changes and is not 
even directly causally related to it.  
The idea, however, that so-called relational changes (changes in the 
relations an object bears to other objects and properties), amount to real, 
socially and causally significant changes is at present no longer considered 
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strange.5 Think of yourself being elected head of a committee. The change is 
relational, not intrinsic. But it is significant: you have acquired causal 
powers you did not have before: because you are from now on regarded in a 
specific manner, what you say as head of the comittee has effects that the 
same words uttered by you would lack should you not have been so elected.  
 So, not all relational change is mere Cambridge change. And it is clear from 
Nozick’s writings that he does not consider what goes on in the 
teletransportation identity change is a mere Cambridge change. Nor should 
he. The consequences are more than significant (once again, here we see 
Nozick’s pragmatic attitude on this issue). What Noonan ignores are the 
social dimensions of personhood. 
 But that can be intentional. Noonan’s reason for ignoring social 
dimensions, insofar as they can be reconstructed, reflect the intuition that 
really is behind the fierce opposition against CCV. He explicitly approaches 
persons from a metaphysical, ontological angle. The debate over criteria of 
personal identity over time is a debate not over how we know that y at t2 is 
identical to x at t1, but over what it takes, ontologically or metaphysically, 
for this transtemporal identity to hold. Noonan stresses this point more 
than once. As such the point merely says correctly that the issue of personal 
identity is not a merely epistemological issue. Why should this rule out 
social dimensions, dimensions of how people are regarded and consequently 
treated (by themselves as well as others)? Well, how can events that are 
external to (and initially not even causally related to) either or both of two 
person stages determine ontologically or metaphysically whether or not these 
stages are part of the continued existence of one person? 
 (Note here that, again, the impression is given that CCV belongs in 
category (2) of the introduction. External events cannot be of metaphysical 
influence, according to Noonan. Deeming such events relevant, as CCV 
does, then, means that one is putting non-metaphysical constraints on a 
metaphysics of personal identity. Like Wiggins appears to do, Noonan 
implicitly places CCV, incorrectly as I shall argue, in category (2).) 
 Noonan's argument may look like a simple reaffirmation of the only x and 
y principle. But it goes deeper. It uncovers a contestable intuition behind 
the principle: when the diachronic identity relation between x and y is of a 
metaphysical nature, external events have nothing to do with it. Put 
differently: If a relation such as ‘being temporal stages of the same person’ is 
metaphysical, it involves only properties internal to the relata.  
                                                           
5 The idea that not all relational change is mere Cambridge change is elaborately and very 
vividly expressed in Baker 1995.  
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 But why should we accept this contestable intuition? One answer is that 
we should accept it if ‘metaphysical’ is interpreted as ‘natural’ or ‘physical’. 
When two stages of a stone, say, at different times are stages of the same 
stone, this fact can in no way be determined by factors that are (causally) 
external to the stone. And when ‘person’ is like a natural kind term, as 
animalists like Wiggins hold who consider the term ‘person’ equivalent to 
‘human being’, this ought to apply to persons too. So, the combined 
argumentative force of Wiggins’s and Noonan’s point is that metaphysical 
relations such as personal identity involve only internal properties of the 
relata when ‘metaphysical’ is interpreted as ‘natural’ or ‘physical’, which is 
precisely what e.g. Wiggins’s animalism does.  
 But this argumentative force can be countered. Persons are at least not 
merely natural kinds—they are social kinds as well. And when the 
metaphysics of personhood accomodates this fact, Noonan’s intuition that 
metaphysical relations between person stages that constitute personal 
identity involve merely internal properties of the stages must be challenged. 
If who I am, not just as a human being but as a (deserving, responsible, 
accountable) person, is co-determined by a network of social interactions 
and the range of potential social interactions available to me due to my social 
status, then spelling out who I am involves mentioning items and events that 
are external to me and not even causally connected to me. And if that is the 
case, the same goes for spelling out the relations that make various temporal 
stages of me stages of the same person. The metaphysics of personhood 
involves the social world as well as the natural world and hence the same 
goes for the metaphysics of personal identity. 
 And so, it is at least open to the defender of CCV to claim that the only x 
and y principle in the present context is mistaken. But I am interested here 
not so much in defending Nozick as in unearthing the deep difference 
between Nozick’s CCV and positions based on the only x and y principle. It 
is my claim that in view of the above analysis, this difference can best be 
represented as a difference between an internalist and an externalist 
metaphysical approach to personhood and personal identity.   
 I’d like to draw a parallel here with the internalism/externalism difference 
as it is applied to mental content. Externalism about mental content such as 
it was first developed in Putnam’s famous twin Earth argument (Putnam 
1975) involves the modal claim that two physically/naturally identical 
persons can nevertheless be in mental states with different contents, 
depending on their surroundings. In putnam’s example, twin Earth is 
exactly like Earth except that what functions as water does on our Earth is in 
fact constituted by a different chemical substance on twin Earth; not H2O 
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but XYZ. An Earth person can then be physically identical with a twin-Earth 
person when both are thinking “there is a glass of water in front of me”, 
while she is wrong and the twin-Earth person right. This is the case since by 
“water” she means “the stuff present at the ‘baptizing ceremony’, when it 
was first dubbed ‘water’, i.e. H2O” and the twin-Earth person “the stuff 
present at the ‘baptizing ceremony’, when it was first dubbed ‘water’, i.e. 
XYZ” (Putnam calls XYZ ‘twater’, but for the example there is no obstacle 
for assuming that on twin-Earth they call XYZ ‘water’). There is XYZ in the 
glass, so only the twin-Earth person has a mental state whose content is true; 
the Earth person’s content is false. The content of the thought “there is 
water in the glass in front of me”, then, is co-determined by factors that are 
external to the subject and possibly not even causally connected to it (the 
Earth person is not causally connected to the meaning-giving procedure on 
twin Earth). Mental content, as it is called, is a wide property (which means 
that it is co-determined by factors external to the subject who has the mental 
state at issue) not a narrow one (where a narrow property is one that is 
determined completely by factors internal to the subject).  
 Parallel to externalism about mental content, Nozick’s CCV can be called 
an externalist view on personal identity: whether y at t2 is identical to x at t1 
depends on the one hand (i) on there being the appropriate connections 
between properties internal to x and y but on the other hand (ii) on the 
absence of a rival z at t2 that is a closer continuer of x at t1. Lemma (ii) turns 
y’s property of being identical with x into a wide property. The plausibility of 
this claim is derived from the acknowledgement that a person is not merely 
a natural kind, but at least also a ‘social kind’. By contrast, the metaphysics 
of personal identity of both Noonan and Wiggins (and a host of others) 
turns the identity of y with x into a narrow property, i.e. a property that is 
wholly determined by facts internal to x and y.  
 The strongest interpretation of CCV, then, is as an externalist view on 
personal identity. In fact, since on any other interpretation the arguments 
by Wiggins and Noonan falsify CCV, this is the only really feasible 
interpretation. And this interpretation turns CCV into a theory that is 
motivated by the conviction that 'person' is a broad term and that 'personal 
identity' has broad necessary  and sufficient conditions. This is a 
metaphysical conviction. The impression that CCV is about practical 
contraints on metaphysical theories, then, is mistaken.  
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